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1 Introduction
In game theory, strategy for a player is defined as “a set of rules that describe
exactly how (...) [a] player should choose, depending on how the [other] players
have chosen at earlier moves” [14]. Notice that this definition of strategies is
static, and presumably constructed before the game is actually played.
For example, consider chess. According to Zermelo’s well-known theorem,
chess is determined [22]. Then, why would you play chess if you know you will
lose (or won’t win) the game? Clearly, if we have logical omniscience (which we
don’t), then it is pointless for the player, who is going to lose, to even start playing
the game as she knows the outcome already. If we are not logical omniscient, and
have only a limited amount of computational power and memory (which we do),
then chess is only a perfect information game for God. Therefore, there seems to
be a problem. The static, pre-determined notion of strategies falls short analyzing
perfect information games. Because, we, people, do not strategize as such even
in perfect information games - largely because we are not logically omniscient,
and we have limited memory, and computational and deductive power.
While people play games, they observe, learn, recollect and update their
strategies during the game as well as adopting deontological strategies and goals
before the game. Players update and revise their strategies, for instance, when
their opponent makes an unexpected or irrational move. Similarly, sometimes
external factors may force the players not to make some certain moves. For in-
stance, assume that you are playing a video game by using a gamepad or a
keyboard, and in the middle of the game, one of the buttons on the gamepad
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Fig. 1. Centipede game
brakes. Hence, from that moment on, you will not be able to make some moves
in the game that are controlled by that button on the gamepad. This is most
certainly not part of your strategy. Therefore, you will need to revise your strat-
egy in such a way that some moves will be excluded from your strategy from
that moment on. However, for your opponent, that is not the case as she can
still make all the moves available to her.
Moreover, in some cases, assumptions about the game or the players may fail
as well. For instance, consider the centipede game between two players P1 and
P2 (Figure 1). Under the assumption of common rationality, the usual backward
induction scheme produces the solution that P1 needs to make a d move at s0.
What happens then, if P1 is prohibited or prevented from making d move at
s0 and onwards right after the beginning of the game (or similarly, if the key
on the gamepad that is used to make a d move is broken)? It means that from
a behavioral perspective, the assumption of common rationality is violated and
P2 may need to update her strategy during the game based on what she has
observed. There can be many reasons why P1 may make such a move. The move
d might have been prohibited for P1 right after the game has started, or it may
be a taboo for that specific player to make that move, or it may have been simply
forbidden or restricted by an external factor (nature, God etc.).
In this paper, we focus on what we call move updates where some moves
become unavailable during the game. Clearly, there can be considered many
other forms of updates, revisions and restrictions that can happen during the
game play. For instance, some states may become unavailable in the midst of
the game for some players. Moreover, manipulation games where a third party
or God/nature affects the outcome of the game are also examples of such games
where dynamic strategy analysis is much needed.
Our goal here is to present a formal framework for move based strategy
restrictions by extending strategy logic (henceforth, SL) which was introduced
by Ramanujam and Simon [19]. The rest of the paper is structured as follows.
Section 2 provides a short reminder of SL. In Section 3, the framework of SL
is extended with strategic move restrictions, and completeness of the resulting
logic is shown. Then, we investigate some decision theoretical problems and give
a complexity bound for the model checking problem in SL - which was an open
problem so far. Finally, we conclude by placing RSL in the context of related
work, followed by a conclusion and ideas for future research. The Appendix
contains proofs of all propositions and theorems stated in Section 3.
2 Strategy logic
In this section, we give a short overview of the strategy logic [12,19]. The focus
is on games played between two players given by the set N = {1, 2}, and a single
set of moves Σ for both. Let T = (S,⇒, s0) be a tree rooted at s0 ∈ S, on the
set of vertices S. A partial function ⇒: S×Σ → S specifies the labeled edges of
such a tree where labels represent the moves at the states. The extensive form
game tree, then, is a pair T = (T, λ) where T is a tree as defined before, and
λ : S → N specifies whose turn it is at each state. A strategy µi for a player
i ∈ N is a function µi : Si → Σ where Si = {s ∈ S : λ(s) = i}. For player i
and strategy µi, the strategy tree Tµ = (Sµ,⇒µ, s0, λµ) is the least subtree of T
satisfying the following two natural conditions:
1. s0 ∈ Sµ;
2. For any s ∈ Sµ, if λ(s) = i, then there exists a unique s′ ∈ Sµ and action
a such that s
a
⇒µ s′. Otherwise, if λ(s) 6= i, then for all s′ with s
a
⇒ s′ for
some a, we have s
a
⇒µ s′.
In other words, in the strategy tree, the root is included, and for the states
that belong to the strategizing player, a unique move is assigned to the player,
and for the other player, all possible moves are considered. Notice that, in SL,
strategies return unique moves. Nevertheless, we would still have a tree even if
the strategies are set-valued.
The most basic constructions in SL are strategy specifications. First, for a
given countable set X , a set of basic formulas BF (X) is defined as follows, for
a ∈ Σ:
BF (X) := x ∈ X | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∧ ϕ | 〈a〉ϕ
Let P i be a countable set of atomic observables for player i, with P = P 1 ∪ P 2.
The syntax of strategy specifications is given as follows for ϕ ∈ BF (P i):
Strati(P i) := [ϕ→ a]i | σ1 + σ2 | σ1 · σ2
The specification [ϕ→ a]i at player i’s position stands for “play a whenever ϕ
holds”. The specification σ1+σ2 means that the strategy of the player conforms
to the specification σ1 or σ2 and σ1 · σ2 means that the strategy of the player
conforms to the specifications σ1 and σ2.
Let M = (T, V ) where T = (S,⇒, s0, λ) is an extensive form game tree as
defined before, and V : S → 2P is a valuation function for the set of proposi-
tional variables P . The truth of a formula ϕ ∈ BF (P ) is given as usual for the
propositional, Boolean and modal formulas.
The notion “strategy µ conforms to specification σ for player i at state s”
(notation µ, s |=i σ) is defined as follows, where outµ(s) denotes the unique
outgoing edge at s with respect to µ.
µ, s |=i [ϕ→ a]i iff M, s |= ϕ implies outµ(s) = a
µ, s |=i σ1 + σ2 iff µ, s |=i σ1 or µ, s |=i σ2
µ, s |=i σ1 · σ2 iff µ, s |=i σ1 and µ, s |=i σ2
Now, based on the strategy specifications, the syntax of the strategy logic
SL is given as follows:
p | ¬ϕ | ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2 | 〈a〉ϕ | (σ)i : a | σ  i ψ
for p ∈ P , a ∈ Σ, σ ∈ Strati(P i), and ψ ∈ BF (P i). We read (σ)i : a as “at the
current state the strategy specification σ for player i suggests that the move a
can be played”. Subsequently, we read σ  i ψ as “following strategy σ player i
can ensure ψ”. The other connectives and modalities are defined as usual.
We now define the set of available moves at a state s as moves(s) := {a ∈
Σ : ∃s′ ∈ S with s
a
⇒ s′}. Then, based on moves, we inductively construct the
set of enabled moves at state s in strategy σ as follows.
– [ψ → a]i(s) =


{a} : λ(s) = i;M, s |= ψ, a ∈ moves(s)
∅ : λ(s) = i;M, s |= ψ, a /∈ moves(s)
Σ : otherwise
– (σ1 + σ2)(s) = σ1(s) ∪ σ2(s)
– (σ1 · σ2)(s) = σ1(s) ∩ σ2(s)
The truth definition for the strategy formulas are as follows:
M, s |= 〈a〉ϕ iff ∃s such that s
a
⇒ s′ and M, s′ |= ϕ
M, s |= (σ)i : a iff a ∈ σ(s)
M, s |= σ  i ψ iff ∀s′ such that s⇒∗σ s
′ in Ts|σ,
we have M, s′ |= ψ ∧ (turni → enabledσ)
where σ(s) is as before, and ⇒∗σ denotes the reflexive transitive closure of ⇒σ.
Furthermore, Ts is the tree that consists of the unique path from the root (s0)
to s and the subtree rooted at s, and Ts|σ is the least subtree of Ts that contains
a unique path from s0 to s and from s onwards, for each player i node, all
the moves enabled by σ, and for each node of the opponent player, all possible
moves . The proposition turni denotes that it is i’s turn to play. Finally, define
enabledσ =
∨
a∈Σ(〈a〉⊤ ∧ (σ)i : a). Now, we give the axioms of SL.
– All the substitutional instances of the tautologies of propositional calculus
– [a](ϕ→ ψ)→ ([a]ϕ→ [a]ψ)
– 〈a〉ϕ→ [a]ϕ
– 〈a〉⊤ → ([ψ → a]i : a)i for all a ∈ Σ
– [turni ∧ ψ ∧ ([ψ → a]i)i : a)]→ 〈a〉⊤
– turni ∧ ([ψ → a]i)i : c↔ ¬ψ for all a 6= c
– (σ + σ′)i : a↔ (σ : a)i ∨ (σ′ : a)i
– (σ · σ′)i : a↔ (σ : a)i ∧ (σ′ : a)i
– σ  i ψ → [ψ ∧ inv
σ
i (a, ψ) ∧ inv
σ
−i(ψ) ∧ enabledσ]
Here, invσi (a, ψ) = (turni ∧ (σ)i : a) → [a](σ  i ψ) which expresses the fact
that after an a move by i which conforms to σ, the statement σ  i ψ continues
to hold, and invσ−i(ψ) = turni → ⊙(σ  i ψ) states that after any move of −i,
σ  i ψ continues to hold. Here, ©ϕ ≡
∨
a∈Σ〈a〉ϕ and ⊙ϕ ≡ ¬©¬ϕ.
Now, we discuss the inference rules that SL employs: modus ponens and
generalization for [a] for each a ∈ Σ. The induction rule is a bit more complex:
From the formulas ϕ ∧ (turni ∧ (σ)i : a) → [a]ϕ, ϕ ∧ turn−i → ⊙ϕ, and ϕ →
ψ∧enabledσ derive ϕ→ σ  i ψ. The axiom system of SL is sound and complete
with respect to the given semantics [19].
3 Restricted strategy logic
3.1 Basics
Let us now extend SL to restricted strategy logic, henceforth RSL, by allowing
move restrictions during the game. Recall that our motivation can be illustrated
with the example of a gamepad/keyboard which gets broken during the game
play disallowing the player to make some certain moves from that moment on.
We denote the move restriction by [σ!a]i for a strategy specification σ, and
move a for player i. Informally, after the move restriction of σ by a, player i will
not be able to make an a move. We incorporate restrictions in RSL at the level of
strategy specifications. In SL, recall that strategies are functions. Therefore, they
only produce one move per state. However, our dynamic take in strategies cover
more general cases where strategies can offer a set of moves to the player. Thus,
in RSL, we define strategy µi as µi : Si → 2Σ . By outrµi(s) we will denote
the set of moves returned by µi at s. Then, the extended syntax of strategy
specifications for player i is given as follows.
Strati(P i) := [ψ → a]i | σ + σ | σ · σ | [σ!a]i
Notice that the restrictions affect only the player who gets a move restriction.
In other words, if a is prohibited to player i, it does not mean that some other
player j cannot make an a move. In other words, if my gamepad/keyboard is
broken, it doesn’t mean that yours is broken as well.
Once a move is restricted at a state, we will prone the strategy tree removing
the prohibited move from that state on. Therefore, given µi : Si → 2Σ, we define
the updated strategy relation µi!a : Si → 2Σ−{a}. We are now ready to define
confirmation of restricted specifications to strategies. Note that we skip the cases
for · and + as they are exactly the same.
µ, s |=i [ϕ→ a]i iff M, s |= ϕ implies a ∈ outrµ(s)
µi, s |=i [σ!a]i iff a /∈ outrµi(s) and µ!a, s |=i σ
In the sequel, we omit the superscript that indicates the agents, thus, we write
S for Si, and σ!a for [σ!a]i when it is obvious. Given a strategy µ and its
strategy tree Tµ = (Sµ,⇒µ, s0, λµ), we define the restricted strategy structure
Tµ!a with respect to an action a. Once we removed the restricted moves, the
updated structure may not be a tree (it may be a forest). For this reason, we
take (µ!a, s) as the connected component of Tµ!a that includes s. Therefore,
for a fixed strategy, restrictions may yield different restricted strategy trees at
different states. This is perfectly fine for our intuition, because the state of the
game where the restriction is made is important. In other words, it matters where
may gamepad is broken during the game play. Now, for player i and strategy µi
and move a, the restricted strategy tree Tµ!a = (Sµ!a,⇒µ!a, s
′, λµ!a) is the least
subtree of T satisfying the following two conditions:
1. s′ ∈ Sµ!a;
2. For any s ∈ Sµ!a, if λ(s) = i, then for each action b 6= a ∈ µ!a(s), there exists
a unique t ∈ Sµ!a such that s
b
⇒µ!a t. Otherwise, if λ(s) 6= i, then for all t
with s
b
⇒ t for b 6= a, we have s
b
⇒µ!a t.
Note that we introduce such conditions so that an RSL model can easily be
considered as a submodel of a SL model with some additional assumptions. We
can now make some further observations. By the abuse of the notation, we will
use ↔ to denote the equivalence of strategy specifications with respect to the
conformation relation.
Proposition 1. For any strategy µ, state s, specification σ, and formula ψ,
µ, s 6|= [[ψ → a]!a].
Proposition 2. For strategy specifications σ and σ′, and move a, (σ · σ′)!a ↔
(σ!a) · (σ′!a) and (σ + σ′)!a↔ (σ!a) + (σ′!a).
Restrictions stabilize immediately. For n ≥ 1, we use notation σ!na to denote
n ≥ 1-consecutive restrictions of σ by move a. Similarly, we put µ!na for the
corresponding strategy tree µ.
Proposition 3. For arbitrary strategy specification σ, move a and state s,
(σ!a)!a↔ σ!a. Moreover, we have σ!na↔ σ!a.
Since restrictions are local and operate by elimination, the order of the re-
strictions does not matter.
Proposition 4. For any moves a and b, (σ!a)!b↔ (σ!b)!a.
3.2 A Case Study: The Centipede Game
Let us consider the centipede game (see Figure 1), and see how RSL can for-
malize it when a restricted strategy specification can change the game after an
unexpected (or even irrational) move. Let us call the players P1 and P2. The set
of actions in the centipede game is Σ = {d, a} where d, a mean that the player
moves down or across, respectively. Utilities for individual players are indicated
by a tuple (x, y) where x is the utility for P1, and y is the utility for P2. For the
sake of generality, we will not impose any further conditions on the strategies.
In a recent work, Artemov approached the centipede game from a rationality
and epistemology based point of view [1]. Now, similar to his approach, we will
use symbols r1 and r2 to denote the propositions “P1 is rational” and “P2 is
rational”, respectively. Let us now construct rational strategies µ and ν for P1
and P2 respectively following the backward induction scheme. At s4, P1 makes
a d move, if she is rational. Therefore, we have µ, s4 |= [r1 → d]P1. However,
at s3, P2 would be aware of P1’s possible move at s4 and the fact that P1
is rational as well, thus makes a d move if she herself is rational. So, we have
ν, s3 |= [(r2 ∧ (〈a〉r1 ∨ 〈d〉r1)) → d]P2. Following the same strategy, we obtain
the following.
•
s0, P1 a
(0, 2)
s7
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d
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//
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Fig. 2. Restricted centipede game-tree
µ, s2 |= [r1 ∧ (〈a〉(r2 ∧ (〈a〉r1 ∨ 〈d〉r1) ∨ 〈d〉(r2 ∧ (〈a〉r1 ∨ 〈d〉r1)))→ d]
P1
ν, s1 |= [r2∧(〈a〉(r1∧(〈a〉(r2∧(〈a〉r1∨〈d〉r1)∨〈d〉(r2∧(〈a〉r1∨〈d〉r1))))〈d〉(r1∧
(〈a〉(r2 ∧ (〈a〉r1 ∨ 〈d〉r1) ∨ 〈d〉(r2 ∧ (〈a〉r1 ∨ 〈d〉r1)))))→ d]P2
µ, s0 |= [(r1 ∧ (〈a〉(r2 ∧ (〈a〉(r1 ∧ (〈a〉(r2 ∧ (〈a〉r1 ∨ 〈d〉r1) ∨ 〈d〉(r2 ∧ (〈a〉r1 ∨
〈d〉r1))))〈d〉(r1 ∧ (〈a〉(r2 ∧ (〈a〉r1 ∨〈d〉r1)∨〈d〉(r2 ∧ (〈a〉r1 ∨〈d〉r1))))))∨〈d〉(r2 ∧
(〈a〉(r1 ∧ (〈a〉(r2 ∧ (〈a〉r1 ∨ 〈d〉r1) ∨ 〈d〉(r2 ∧ (〈a〉r1 ∨ 〈d〉r1))))〈d〉(r1 ∧ (〈a〉(r2 ∧
(〈a〉r1 ∨ 〈d〉r1) ∨ 〈d〉(r2 ∧ (〈a〉r1 ∨ 〈d〉r1)))))))→ d]
P1
Let ♦ϕ := 〈a〉ϕ ∨ 〈d〉ϕ. Then, we have the following statements.
µ, s4 |= [r1 → d]P1
ν, s3 |= [r2 ∧ ♦r1 → d]P2
µ, s2 |= [r1 ∧ ♦(r2 ∧ ♦r1)→ d]P1
ν, s1 |= [r2 ∧ ♦(r1 ∧ ♦(r2 ∧ ♦r1))→ d]P2
µ, s0 |= [r1 ∧ ♦(r2 ∧ ♦(r1 ∧ ♦(r2 ∧ ♦r1)))→ d]P1
Therefore, backward inductively, under the assumption of common rational-
ity, we observe that P1 should make a d move at s0. Furthermore, this can be
generalized to many other games.
Theorem 1. Assuming common rationality in RSL framework, backward in-
duction scheme produces a unique solution in games with ordinal pay-offs.
Argument for the proof of the theorem is quite straight-forward. Even if the
strategies may be set valued, and hence return a set of moves per state, the
assumption of common rationality forces the player to choose the move which
returns the highest pay-off. Since this fact is known among players, by induction,
we can show that the solution is unique.
Let us follow the backward induction scheme again with the updated game
tree given above. Notice that the specification [r1 → d]P1 does not conform with
µ!d (as µ!d, s 6|= [[r1 → d]
P1!d]P1 for all s)1. Therefore, after the move restriction
rational move for P1 is not admissible for her from that point on. Thus, µ!d
conforms to those specifications that implies an a move. Thus, µ!d, s4 |= [⊤ →
a]P1 ·¬[r1 → d]P1. Therefore, at s3, being rational, P2 choses the move with the
highest pay-off, and makes an a move. Thus, ν, s3 |= r2 ∧ (♦¬[r1 → d])→ a]P2.
1 We slightly abuse the formal language here. For a specification σ, we put µ, s |= ¬σ
if it is not the case that µ, s |= σ.
Similarly, at s1, we have ν, s1 |= r2 ∧ (♦¬[r1 → d] ∧ ♦(r2 ∧ (♦¬[r1 → d]))) →
a]P2. Finally, at the root, we have µ!d, s0 |= [⊤ → a]P1. Thus, in the restricted
centipede game, clearly, P1 has to make an a move.
Even if it is not in the scope of this paper, this example also shows that
we can view rationality as a set of restrictions. Namely, some restrictions forces
the players to play irrationally, while some restrictions allow them to play ratio-
nally. RSL, in this respect, gives a framework where both rational and irrational
strategies can be analyzed.
3.3 Axiomatization, Completeness, and Complexity
Before discussing the axiomatization of RSL, we note that the set of available
moves moves is defined as previously. Then, we define the set of enabled moves
for the move restriction operator as ([σ!a]i)(s) = σ(s)−{a}. Namely, if the move
a is not allowed any more, it should not be enabled.
We now give the syntax of RSL, which is the same as that of SL.
p | (σ)i : a | ¬ϕ | ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2 | 〈a〉ϕ | σ  i ψ
The semantics and the truth definitions of the formulas are defined as earlier
with the exception of strategy specifications for restrictions (cf. Section 2). The
axiom system of RSL consists of the axioms and rules of SL together with the
following additional axiom for the added specification construct.
– (σ!a)i : c↔ turni ∧ ¬((σ)i : a) ∧ (σ)i : c
The soundness of the given axiom is straightforward and hence skipped. The
new specification we introduced does not bring along an extra derivation rule
since the new operator is at the level of specifications, not the formulas.
Now, we observe that restricted moves are not enabled. We state it as a
theorem with an immediate proof.
Theorem 2. (σ!a)i : a↔ ⊥.
As expected, the system RSL is complete.
Theorem 3. RSL is complete with respect to the given semantics.
However, the decidability of RSL and SL are not immediate. To the best of
our knowledge, SL has not yet been proved to be decidable (or undecidable).
Here, we show an upper bound for the model checking problem for both logics.
Now, we discuss a reduction of SL to (multi-modal) Computational Tree
Logic CTL*. We refer the readers who are not familiar with CTL* to [9,10].
First, we discuss how to construct a CTL* model based on a given SL/RSL
model, then describe a translation from SL to CTL*.
Let us take a strategy model M = (T, V ) where T = (S,⇒, s0, λ). Notice
that the function⇒ was defined from S×Σ to S. We can redefine it by currying.
Given ⇒: S × Σ → S, we can define the transition
a
⇒: S → S for each move a.
Therefore, we can curry⇒ to get⇒=
⋃
a∈Σ
a
⇒. We can think ofM as a pointed
multi-modal CTL* tree model M∗ = (S, s0, {
a
⇒}a∈Σ , V ) that has next time
modalities for each action. In this case, corresponding to each binary relation
a
⇒, we will have a dynamic next-time modality Xa which quantifies over the
sub-path on the same branch (note that state formulas are also path formulas
[10]). For the reflexive-transitive closure of
a
⇒, we will use  for all accessible
future times in the same branch. Before giving the translation of SL specifications
and formulas into CTL*, let us introduce some special propositions. We label
the states that are returned by a strategy µ with the proposition strategyµ,
stipulating that strategyµ holds only at those points. Notice that given two
points in the domain of µ, there is a unique path between these two (which
satisfies strategyµ). Moreover, we use turni as a proposition that denotes that
it is i’s turn to play, i.e. s |= turni iff s ∈ Si.
We now give two translations. First, tr translates strategy specifications to
CTL* formulas while the second Tr translates SL formulas to CTL* formulas.
Given a strategy µ, conformation to µ is translated as follows.
– tr([ψ → a]i) = Tr(ψ)→ E(strategyµ ∧ Xa⊤)
– tr(σ1 + σ2) = tr(σ1) ∨ tr(σ2)
– tr(σ1 · σ2) = tr(σ1) ∧ tr(σ2)
Notice that in the first case, the translation makes use of the formula trans-
lation Tr for formula ψ as defined below. Assuming the correctness of Tr (which
we show in Theorem 5), correctness of the translation tr is straightforward.
Theorem 4. Let µ be a strategy and σ a strategy specification in SL, and let µ∗
be the corresponding (sub)tree in a CTL* model. Then, µ, s |= σ iff µ∗, s |= tr(σ).
Here follows the translation Tr of formulas from SL to CTL* skipping the
Boolean cases. Note that the translation is very similar to the Kripke semantics
for Propositional Dynamic Logic where for each action a, a relation Ra and a
modality 〈a〉 associated with Ra are introduced.
– Tr(〈a〉ϕ) = XaTr(ϕ)
– Tr((σ)i : c) = Xc⊤ for c ∈ σ(s)
– Tr((σ)i : c) = ⊥ if c /∈ σ(s)
– Tr(σ  i ψ) = E(strategyσ ∧ (Tr(ψ) ∧ (turni → enabledσ)))
Now, the atom enabledσ is true at a state s in CTL* if and only if for at least
one a ∈ Σ we have Xa⊤ and a ∈ σ(s). Finally, the CTL* correspondence of σ(s)
to the set of enabled moves at s by the strategy specification σ is defined exactly
as before with one small arrangement in the definition of admissible moves at a
given state s, namely moves(s) = {a : s |=CTL∗ Xa⊤}. As an example, consider
the translation of the proposition outµ = a. Recall that it means that a is the
unique outgoing edge according to strategy µ at the state where the formula
is interpreted. Therefore, there is a branch that is followed by strategy µ, and
at that branch, at the current state, a is an admissible move. This corresponds
to the translation E(strategyµ ∧ Xa⊤). The following theorem summarizes our
efforts here.
Theorem 5. Let M be a SL model and let M∗ be its CTL* correspondent.
Then, M, s |= ϕ iff M∗, s |= Tr(ϕ) for any state s ∈ S.
Note that the translation we suggest is model-dependent. For example, the
predicate strategyµ, depends on the strategy µ, thus the model. For this reason,
the suggested translation is not entirely syntactic and does not give us an imme-
diate decidability result (using the fact that CTL* is decidable). However, model
checking problem for CTL* is PSPACE-complete [9]. Therefore, we have an up-
per bound for the complexity of the model checking problem for SL. We next
observe that the model checking problem for both SL and RSL are in PSPACE.
Theorem 6. The model checking problem for SL is in PSPACE.
Corollary 1. The model checking problem for RSL is in PSPACE.
4 Related Work and Conclusion
From a logical point of view, the idea of treating strategies as the “unsung heroes
of games” can be traced back to van Benthem [4,5]. In line with this program,
Ramanujam, Simon, and Paul [15,18,19,20] have initiated a study within game
theory and dynamic logic by taking strategies as the focus of concern and treating
them as the primitives of games. They discuss strategies as a way of reasoning
within and about games, and investigate how games and strategies behave under
some further assumptions.
The game-theoretical approach to the centipede game was initiated by Rosen-
thal [21], which was followed by several solution methods [2,13]. More recently,
the role of rationality in its solution methods has been discussed [3,6] and ex-
tended to some other cases [16].The role knowledge as opposed to beliefs has
been discussed in similar contexts by Artemov [1]. Moreover, based on experi-
mental work, Ghosh, Meijering and Verbrugge aim to observe how humans reason
strategically [11]. They consider simple centipede-like games from the cognitive
point of view, and use strategy logic to formalize their findings.
This work is built on the aforementioned studies, and introduces a dynamic
twist in formalizing strategies in games. What we suggest is a formal framework
where restrictions in strategies are allowed during the game. We propose a new
logic, called restricted strategy logic (RSL), to express strategy restrictions. We
show its completeness and discuss model checking issues. Along the way, we
also discuss model checking of SL, which has not been done so far (to the best
of our knowledge). We claim that RSL presents a succinct way to represent
strategy revisions. One direction for future research concerns the question on
how RSL can be connected to the switching strategy frameworks. Additionally,
one could come up with an restriction methodology where players change their
rationality assumption. Note that, within the framework of RSL, different types
of rationality (utilitiarian, deontological etc) can be seen as a different set of
restrictions. For instance, a player can initially commit herself to a maxmin
type of strategy and then change her commitment to a maxmax type of strategy.
Therefore, such changes can be represented from switching from restriction set
A to restriction set A′, for instance. In short, different types of rationality can
cause different revisions in players’ strategies. We leave such analysis to future
work.
Moreover, note that the way strategy restrictions work, and its completeness
proof resemble public announcement logic [8,17]. In the case of RSL, the move
restriction can be seen as a prohibitive negative announcement, corresponding
to an elimination of moves that agree with the prohibition.
In conclusion, we believe that RSL presents a concise and natural framework
for dynamic strategizing in games, and it can be extended in several thought-
provoking ways.
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Appendix: Proofs
Proof (Proposition 2). Consider the first case.
µ, s |= (σ · σ′)!a iff a /∈ outrµ(s) and µ!a, s |= σ · σ′
iff a /∈ outrµ(s) and µ!a, s |= σ and µ!a, s |= σ′
iff a /∈ outrµ(s) and µ!a, s |= σ), and
a /∈ outrµ(s) and µ!a, s |= σ′)
iff µ, s |= σ!a and µ, s |= σ′!a
The remaining cases are similar. ⊓⊔
Proof (Proposition 3). We start with considering the cases where the restrictions
are applied consecutively twice. We use Proposition 2.
µ, s |= (σ!a)!a iff a /∈ outrµ(s) and µ!a, s |= σ!a
iff a /∈ outrµ(s) and (outµ(s) 6= a and (µ!a)!a, s |= σ)
iff a /∈ outrµ(s) and µ!a, s |= σ
iff µ, s |= σ!a
Now, we generalize to the case for n. The proof is by induction on n. The
case for n = 1 is trivial and the case for n = 2 was presented above. Assume
now that n ≥ 2 and the claim holds for every integer less than or equal to n. We
will now show it for n+ 1.
µ, s |= σ!na iff
µ, s |= (σ!n−1a)!a iff a /∈ outrµ(s) and µ!a, s |= σ!n−1a
iff a /∈ outrµ(s) and µ!a, s |= σ!
a induction hyp.
iff µ, s |= σ!a by definition
⊓⊔
Proof (Proposition 4). First, notice that for a strategy µ and moves a, b, we have
(µ!a)!b = (µ!b)!a by definition. Now, let us consider strategy specification σ with
moves a and b.
µ, s |= (σ!a)!b iff b /∈ outrµ(s) and µ!b, s |= σ!a
iff b /∈ outrµ(s) and (a /∈ outrµ(s) and (µ!b)!a, s |= σ)
iff b /∈ outrµ(s) and (a /∈ outrµ(s) and (µ!a)!b, s |= σ)
iff a /∈ outrµ(s) and (b /∈ outrµ(s) and (µ!a)!b, s |= σ)
iff a /∈ outrµ(s) and µ!a, s |= σ!b
iff µ, s |= (σ!b)!a
⊓⊔
Proof (Theorem 3). The completeness of RSL is by reduction to SL. Since we
have one additional strategy specification, we describe an immediate reduction
for that.
First notice that an RSL model is a submodel of a suitable SL model. The
only problem is that, in RSL, strategies are constructed as relations whereas in
SL, the strategies are functions. Therefore, an RSL strategy can be thought of
as a union of several SL strategies. Therefore, a RSL game-tree is a tree model
for a SL model with the suitable union of strategies. Moreover, in RSL, we also
obtain a game-tree model with relational strategies.
Now, the reduction of RSL to SL should be rather immediate. Given a formula
of the form (σ)i : c where σ = σ
′!a for some a, we observe that (by soundness),
it is equivalent to a formula in the language of SL: turni ∧¬((σ)i : a)∧ (σ)i : c.
Similarly, consider the given formula of the form σ  i ψ where σ = σ
′!a for some
a. Notice also that, in SL, σ  i ψ is axiomatically reduced to a formula that uses
formulas of the form (σ)i : a which we have covered just before. Therefore, all
two different types of formulas that may include restricted strategy specifications
are reduced to a formula in the language of SL. Since SL is complete already
[12], and our translation is truth preserving due to soundness, we conclude that
RSL is complete. ⊓⊔
Proof (Theorem 4). Let µ : S → Σ be a strategy and let σ be a strategy speci-
fication in SL for a fixed player i. For simplicity, we omit the superscripts that
indicate the player. First, we describe how to obtain a multi-modal CTL* tree µ∗,
and then show that the translation is truth-preserving. As a reminder, in a strat-
egy tree, we include the root, and for the states that belong to the strategizing
player, we assign a unique move to the player. In addition, we include all other
moves that do not belong to the strategizing player. Therefore, a strategy tree
can be thought of a as branching multi-modal CTL* model. We put w |= turni
if w ∈ Si and at each w ∈ Si, we have one outgoing edge. For v /∈ Si, we have
all admissible moves µ(v) at v. Then, the CTL* model is constructed as follows.
Take S as the set of states of the CTL* model µ∗. Next, for all moves a ∈ Σ, we
have a corresponding accessibility relation Ra in the CTL* model similar to the
Kripke semantics for propositional dynamic logic. Finally, we keep the valuation
the same as in the SL model. Now, let us consider the case σ = [ψ → a]i:
µ, s |= σ iff µ, s |= [ψ → a]i
iff µ, s |= ψ implies outµ = a (by definition)
iff µ∗, s |= Tr(ψ) implies E(strategyµ ∧ Xa⊤)
Here we make use of the formula translation Tr whose correctness will be shown
next. Furthermore, we obtain the last line by the induction hypothesis, and by
the earlier observation we have made about outµ = a. The remaining cases
for the translation tr are straightforward inductions on specifications σ1 + σ2
and σ1 · σ2, and hence left to the reader. Unconventionally, here we make use
of Theorem 5 in the proof of the above statement just because specifications
preceed the formulas in SL. ⊓⊔
Proof (Theorem 5). Take a SL model M and the corresponding multi-modal
CTL* model M∗. We then have the following:
M, s |= 〈a〉ϕ iff ∃s′ s.t. s
a
⇒ s′ and M, s′ |= ϕ (by definition)
∃s′ s.t. s
a
⇒ s′ and M∗, s′ |= Tr(ϕ) (by induction)
M∗, s |= XaTr(ϕ) (by definition)
Similarly, consider the SL formula σ  i ψ:
M, s |= σ  i ψ iff for all s′ such that s⇒∗σ s
′ in Ts|σ, we have,
M, s′ |= ψ ∧ (turni → enabledσ)
(by definition)
iff for all s′ such that s⇒∗ s′ in Ts, we have
M, s′ |= strategyσ ∧ ψ ∧ (turni → enabledσ)
(by definition)
iff for all s′ such that s⇒∗ s′ in Ts, we have
M∗, s′ |= strategyσ ∧Tr(ψ) ∧ (turni → enabledσ)
(by induction)
iffM∗, s |= E[strategyσ ∧Tr(ψ) ∧ (turni → enabledσ)]
(as ⇒∗ denotes the reflexive and transitive closure
on the path Ts on the CTL* tree T )
The last case (σ)i : c is very similar. Recall that this formula is true in SL at
a state s iff c ∈ σ(s). Consider the enabled move c at s, and take a corresponding
next time modality for c, namely Xc. Moreover, at s, the diamond-like modality
Xc has to be enabled giving us Xc⊤ for c ∈ σ(s). ⊓⊔
Proof (Theorem 6). In this proof, we will present two different arguments to
show that the model checking problem for SL is in PSPACE.
First, we show that the translationTr: SL→multi-modal CTL* is polynomial-
time in terms of the length of the formulas. We will denote the length of a speci-
fication or a formula by | · |. We will show that |Tr(ψ)| ≤ |ψ|k for some integer k.
The cases for Booleans are obvious, hence we skip them. For ψ = 〈a〉ϕ, consider
|Tr(〈a〉ϕ)| which is equivalent to |XaTr(ϕ)| = 1+ |Tr(ϕ)|. By induction hypoth-
esis, |Tr(ϕ)| ≤ |ϕ|l for some integer l. Therefore, 1 + |Tr(ϕ)| ≤ |ϕ|k for some
k ≥ 1 + l. Therefore, for ψ = 〈a〉ϕ, we observe |Tr(ψ)| ≤ |ψ|k for some integer
k. In a similar fashion, the case for ψ = (σ)i : c is obvious as |Tr((σ)i : c)| is
always constant. The case for ψ = σ  i ϕ is also very similar. By induction hy-
pothesis, we immediately observe that |Tr(σ  i ϕ)| ≤ 11 + |σ  i ϕ|l (counting
the parantheses as well). Therefore, for some large enough integer k > l, we have
|Tr(σ  i ϕ)| ≤ |σ  i ϕ|k.
Now, we can consider the translation tr for the strategy specifications. The
reason why we consider tr after Tr is the fact that former depends on the
latter. We will now show that, for strategy specification σ, |tr(σ)| ≤ |σ|k for
some integer k. Consider the case where σ = [ψ → a]i. Then, |tr([ψ → a]i)| =
5+ |Tr(ψ)|. By the previous observation, we know that |Tr(ψ)| ≤ |ψ|l for some
integer l. Therefore, 5 + |Tr(ψ)| ≤ |ψ|k for large enough integer k ≥ l. Thus,
tr(ψ → a]i) ≤ |(ψ → a]i)|k for some k. The cases for the · and + operations are
obvious. This concludes the proof that the translation functions tr and Tr are
polynomial-time. Therefore, the complexity of model checking for SL cannot be
higher than PSPACE.
Our second argument is a sketch of a direct reasoning. Similar to the argu-
ments for the complexity of basic modal logic, we just need to check the branches
of the tree model one by one using a depth-first search [7]. Now, fix a SL for-
mula ϕ and a model M . Since SL models are branching tree models, we can
check M , branch by branch, one at a time without any need of considering the
other branches. Namely, the procedure does not need to remember the previ-
ous searches making it effective in the use of space. Moreover, the length of the
branches in M is polynomial in |ϕ| because of the construction of the SL model
M , thus it shows that model checking for SL is in PSPACE. This concludes the
proof that the complexity of the model checking problem for SL is in PSPACE.
⊓⊔
Proof (Corollary 1). We observed that the RSL formulas can be reduced to SL
formulas. The reduction is clearly polynomial, as can be seen from the axioma-
tization (See Section 3.3). Therefore, we can translate any given RSL formula to
a SL in a SL model, which in turn can be translated into a multi-modal CTL*
formula and model. Then, by Theorem 6, we deduce that the complexity of the
model checking problem for RSL is also PSPACE. ⊓⊔
